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Abstract Profitability is not the main driver of
capital investment decision-making; financial evalua-
tion tools often play a secondary role in corporate
investment choices; businesses do not follow capital
finance theory prescriptions, contrary to what main-
stream claims; the strategic character of investments
has a heavier decisional weight than profitability.
These findings are based on a review of different
streams of literature (mainly organizational finance
and strategic decision-making) which is described in
the second part of the paper, after a first part
summarizing the main stances of mainstream energy
economics and the main findings of the alternative
literature on energy-efficiency investments. Yet, what
is a strategic investment? To fill the existing concep-
tual gap, we propose a definition of strategic
investment and a new theoretical framework to
analyze investment projects. An example of applying
this framework to an energy-efficiency project is
described. The partial influence of financial factors
and the importance of strategic factors in investment
decisions entail several implications for energy-
efficiency practitioners, scholars, and public program
developers, which are described in the last part of the
paper.
Keywords Energy-efficiency gap . Investment
decision-making . Capital budgeting tools . Strategic
investment . Barriers to energy efficiency . Indirect
benefits of energy efficiency . Public policy
Introduction
According to capital investment theory, any investment
whose return/profitability is higher than the cost of
capital for the potential investor should be decided upon,
and when there is competition between investments, the
one with the highest return should be decided upon. This
theory has developed various analytical tools—known
as capital budgeting tools1—to evaluate investment
profitability. Do real-world companies obey capital
investment theory injunctions and use their capital
budgeting tools to make investment decisions? The
persistence of an “energy-efficiency gap,” or in other
words, of an under-investment in profitable energy-
technologies, casts doubt on that, but the reality and the
causes of this energy-efficiency gap are cause for
debate among energy researchers.
& According to mainstream energy economics liter-
ature, energy-efficiency investment decisions
made by businesses are strictly based on capital
budgeting analysis; financial considerations ex-
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1 A short description of these capital budgeting tools is given in
the section on Capital Investment Decision-Making Literature,
below.
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clusively explain these decisions, which conform
to capital finance theory. Energy-efficiency invest-
ments are not decided upon because they are
profitable only in appearance, since several
hidden and transaction costs, as well as a high
level of risk, lower their profitability below a
firm’s cost of capital. The mainstream credo is
that financial factors determine investment
decision-making.
& Alternative literature on organizational behavior
regarding energy-efficiency investments has
brought to light the fact that several factors other
than financial strongly influence energy-efficiency
investment decisions made by businesses. Certain
organizational factors, in particular, seem to play
an important role in this regard: organizational
energy culture, power relationships, managers’
interests and mindsets, and finally, characteristics
of the investment itself, in particular, its link with
core business. The influence of these organiza-
tional factors ipso facto reduces the weight of
financial factors on energy-efficiency investment
decision-making. Therefore, according to the
alternative stream, financial factors only partially
determine investment decision-making.
The real issue at stake in the debate about the drivers
of energy-efficiency investments—and about the influ-
ence of financial factors on these decisions—is the
validity of finance and economics theories in explaining
economic agents’ behavior: if companies do not obey
capital investment theory injunctions by not positively
deciding upon profitable investments, this theory can
only have a normative—as opposed to explanatory—
validity. Moreover, firms’ behavior would also chal-
lenge the validity of some fundamental neo-classical
economics assumptions: rational behavior of economic
actors, profit maximization by firms, and market
efficiency. In this regard, it is interesting to note that
energy efficiency is probably the only field (because all
businesses consume energy in all their operations) in
which businesses’ behavior challenges the validity of
these theories so consistently. The importance of the
stakes may explain the intensity of the debate.
But this debate has remained centered mainly
around the issue of energy-efficiency investment
profitability: Is it only apparent, or is it real? This is
because the alternative literature on energy-efficiency
investments lacks the theoretical grounds to explain
its findings and strangely, does not look to other
research fields to explore their findings, compare their
results, or benefit from their explanations.
Some finance and decision-making research does,
in fact, investigate the role of financial factors and of
capital budgeting tools on investment decisions; this
research has also brought to light the strong influence
of the strategic nature of an investment on the
decision-making process and on its result (a positive,
negative, or no-decision).
The first goal of this paper is to review this finance
and decision-making literature concerning the influence
of financial and strategic factors on corporate investment
decision-making, in order to escape the debate on
energy-efficiency investments profitability. The second
goal of the paper is to propose a new framework with
which to analyze energy-efficiency investment projects.
Based on these objectives, the paper is organized into
four parts. A first part summarizes themain arguments of
mainstream energy economics and the main findings of
the alternative literature on energy-efficiency invest-
ments. This is followed by a second part dedicated to a
literature review of the financial and strategic drivers of
capital investment decision-making. This literature re-
view makes the importance of strategic consideration on
investment decision-making evident. Still, what is it that
makes an investment strategic? No satisfying definition
is available in the literature. The third part of the paper
tries to fill theoretical gaps by proposing a definition of
strategic investment and a new conceptual framework to
analyze investment projects. Finally, the fourth part of
the paper briefly describes the implications of the
important role played by strategic aspects in investment
decision-making, for practitioners, policy makers, and
scholars working in the energy-efficiency field.
Energy-efficiency investments literature
Mainstream energy literature: theoretical stances
The theoretical framework which dominates energy-
efficiency investment drivers’ analyses considers
financial factors as the most important in explaining
energy-efficiency investment decisions. For main-
stream energy economists (among others, Anderson
and Newell 2004; Golove and Eto 1996; Jaffe and
Stavins 1994; Sutherland 1991; Van Soest and Bulte
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2001), negative investment decisions are due to a high
level of risk (partially due to irreversibility of energy-
efficiency investments) and a low real return (due to
hidden and transaction costs and, sometimes, to the
fact that energy savings may have been overesti-
mated). Thus, for these economists, the energy-
efficiency gap is not real; energy-saving investments
are technically energy-efficient but economically
inefficient. For instance, Anderson and Newell
(2004, p. 23) state that “we do find evidence that
there are likely many unmeasured costs and risks not
captured in the IAC2 program’s simple financial
estimates, so that estimated rates of return likely
differ from realized rates of return” [authors’ empha-
sis]. This would explain why the rate of return
required for energy-efficiency investments is higher
than the cost of capital for the investor (as described
by DeCanio 1993; Sorrell et al. 2000) or higher than
that required for investments aiming at increasing
production capacity (as discussed by Anderson and
Newell 2004; Kulakowski 1999; Robinson 1991).
Mainstream energy economists therefore conclude that
the assumption of firms’ optimal behavior regarding
energy-efficiency investments remains valid: Within the
framework of admitted market failures (mainly imper-
fect information), barriers in fact reveal a behavior
“indeed optimal from the point of view of energy users”
(Jaffe and Stavins 1994: 805). As summarized by
Sorrell, et al., “the neglect of investment opportunities
[is] a rational decision” (Sorrell et al. 2000: 5).
This analysis is not satisfactory for several reasons:
First, the rate of return for certain projects is such that
none of the explanations provided can explain why
potential investors reject them; second, the first step to
reducing the energy-efficiency gap is a simple adjust-
ment of existing equipment, which is achievable at a
negligible monetary cost; third, it does not explain the
differences in behavior between similar firms operating
in the same industry; fourth, energy economists often
mention the hidden cost but never the hidden benefits of
energy-efficiency investments, although many such
benefits, contrary to the hidden costs, have been
estimated rather precisely (Jakob 2006; Kats et al.
2003; Mills et al. 2008; Mills and Rosenfeld 1994; Pye
and McKane 1999; Worrell et al. 2003).
One may also question the quality of financial
calculations made by companies: “organizations did
not know how to assess the economic potential of their
investments in energy efficiency. The weaknesses in the
financial methodologies used by energy managers and
estate departments for estimating the profitability of
energy efficient criteria principally included making
errors in the estimate of the inflation rate and changes to
future fuel prices. The result of these errors was to
render ‘many investment appraisal analyses meaning-
less’” (BRECSU, 1991: 6, quoted in Rigby: 15).
More profoundly, the financial approach analysis is
flawed in two important aspects: First, one cannot
pretend that profitability is only apparent, when the
costs (hidden and transaction costs) responsible for
this situation are indemonstrable. Besides, it seems
that these costs are not even taken into account by
firms in their investments calculations (on this
subject, see Sorrell et al. 2000: 170). Second, payback
time appears as the financial method most commonly
used by firms as an acceptance rule for energy-
efficiency investments. This means that the debate in
the literature on the high rate of return required for
energy-efficiency investments is artificial insofar as
this rate is only implicit in the payback time method.
When using this method, an investor’s requirements
bear on the time frame necessary to recoup the initial
spending and not on the investment return.
Based on the various flaws described, we can
conclude that the neglect of energy-efficiency invest-
ment opportunities is not properly explained by the
financial analyses of mainstream energy economists.
“Alternative” energy literature: empirical findings
The mainstream approach is contested by several
authors whose works comprise a heterogeneous
alternative energy literature. Their work has shown
that numerous factors influence energy-efficiency
investments: organizational factors such as size,
geographical location, financial performance (DeCanio
1994; DeCanio and Watkins 1998; de Groot et al.
2001), structure (Cebon 1992), energy management
system (Tunnessen 2004), corporate energy culture
(Cebon 1992; Hennicke et al. 1998; Kulakowski 1999;
Sorrell et al. 2000; Stern and Aronson 1984; Togeby et
al. 1997), and power relationships (Cebon 1992;
Sorrell et al. 2000), as well as individual factors such
as the existence and the skills of a manager responsible
for energy issues in the organization (Rigby 2002) or
attitude towards energy (Stern 1992), and external2 US Department of Energy’s Industrial Assessment Centers
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factors such as energy prices. Some factors are of a
structural kind (for instance, more or less central-
ized decision-making), while others are more of a
conjectural kind (such as a price change or a
meeting between two actors as described by Cebon
1992).
One factor in particular is often mentioned as playing
an important role: the (absence of a) link between an
energy-efficiency investment and a company’s core
business (de Groot et al. 2001; Harris et al. 2000;
Parker et al. 2000; Sandberg and Söderström 2003;
Sardianou 2008; Sorrell et al. 2000; Velthuijsen 1993;
Weber 2000, 1997). In studying the factors driving
energy-efficiency investment decisions of 100 Austra-
lian companies, Harris et al. (2000) mention that 35%
of their respondents think that energy efficiency is
often overlooked by management, perhaps because it is
not “core business” (Harris et al. 2000: 874). In their
research on energy-efficiency investment decisions
made by nine large Swedish energy-intensive compa-
nies, Sandberg and Söderström note that “profitability
is far from being the only investment criterion, though
it is very important” and that certain investments have
not been decided upon because they were not core
business (Sandberg and Söderström 2003: 1627). In
the Sardianou survey (2008) of the barriers to energy-
efficiency investments, 60% of the managers inter-
viewed mentioned the fact that energy conservation is
not a “core business activity” as a first-rate barrier.
According to Sorrell et al. (2000: 45), companies “are
found to economize on scarce cognitive resources. In
organizations, this could mean focusing on core
activities, such as the primary production process,
rather than peripheral issues such as energy use.”
Velthuijsen (1993) studied decisions made by 70
companies in seven industries to identify the blocking
and fostering factors to energy-efficiency investments.
According to his results, “non-core business character” is
one of the most important barriers to energy-efficiency
investments. Weber (1997: 834) hypothesizes that
“barriers to energy efficiency in organizations may
result from…a trade-off with non-energy-specific
goals,” which is confirmed by the results of his
empirical research on the decisions having an impact
on energy consumption in 100 Swiss office buildings
between 1986 and 1996: out of the decisions taken,
only 9% have a clear goal to reduce energy consump-
tion, 14% take energy into consideration, and 77% do
not consider their impact on energy consumption at all.
Weber concludes that “energy is generally not an issue
when energy-relevant decisions are taken” (Weber
2000: 431) and that this is due to the lack of a link
with core business. As Weber puts it, “directors are
generally not willing to invest in energy efficiency even
if the investment is profitable. Directors tend to
concentrate on the core business, in which domain
they are knowledgeable and powerful [emphasis
added]. Energy conservation measures are actually
considered to be outside the scope of rent-seeking
actions in firms, whether private or public sector.”
Weber also notes that decisions made with a clear
objective to reduce energy consumption are linked to
the presence of an energy manager or to the fact that
energy is directly managed by a manager of upper
level. Similarly, De Groot et al. (2001) note that less
than 10% of the investments made by Dutch energy-
intensive companies specifically aim at reducing energy
consumption and that “other existing investment
opportunities” is the second most important barrier
(after information) to energy-efficiency investments.
More important or promising investment opportunities
are also mentioned as a barrier to energy-efficiency
investments by 68% of the managers interviewed by
Sardianou (2008). Finally, the Parker et al. (2000)
survey of the decisions made by owners of rental
buildings or hotels is very useful insofar as it better
describes the link between the importance of an
investment for a company’s core business and the
decision made: the primary reason for a positive
decision is not the investment profitability but its
impact on the apartment’s or hotel’s attractiveness. As
described by Parker et al. (2000: 8–9), “tenant comfort
was noted by decision-makers to play a key role…
According to some, energy cost-saving measures might
be passed over if they are perceived as posing an
inconvenience to building tenants (or in the case of
hotel, to guests), such as lighting sensors or after-hours
HVAC3 controls… Perhaps our most striking finding is
the extent to which tenant retention and attraction are
important to building owners that lease their properties,
and can sometimes be, as one respondent noted, ‘the
number-one key’ when making investment decisions. It
should therefore be kept in mind that energy-efficiency
upgrades can be viewed with favor as much for their
ability to please tenants, as for their ability to reduce
the firm’s own operating costs. Furthermore, other
3 Heating Ventilation Air-Conditioning
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firms claimed that they will stretch their customary
financial criteria to invest in low-performing measures,
if they are requested by tenants” [emphasis added]
(Parker et al. 2000: 12).
Altogether, the alternative research on organiza-
tions’ energy-efficiency investments depicts invest-
ment decisions as a complex process which results
from the interaction of numerous factors. Among
these factors, one of the most influential seems to
be the link between the investment under consider-
ation and a company’s core business. In any case,
the high number of factors influencing energy-
efficiency investment decisions ipso facto reduces
the relative weight of financial factors on these
decisions. This logical conclusion has been con-
firmed by De Groot et al. (2001). Their research,
conducted in cooperation with 135 Dutch companies
from nine energy-intensive industries, has shown
that insufficient profitability and access to financial
resources are not the first barriers to energy-
efficiency investments. As summarized by Robinson
(1991: 634): “the point is not that economic factors
are irrelevant in explaining energy-use, but that they
are insufficient.”
However, authors of the alternative stream have
generally not tried to integrate their findings into a
theoretical framework or to compare their findings
with those of other research fields. Yet, some research
in organizational finance, strategic decision-making,
or technology investments has investigated the real
role of financial factors and of strategic considerations
on investment decision-making (not related to energy
efficiency). The following section will describe the
findings of these streams of literature, after a brief
presentation of contrasting perspectives on investment
and of their evaluation tools.
Financial and strategic influences on capital
investment decision-making
Compartmentalized perspectives on investment
Capital investment is little known,4 although it is a
very important economic phenomenon. “Investment
decision-making takes up a very small space in micro
and macroeconomic theories”5 (Guerrien 2002) as
well as in empirical research. Financiers envisage the
investment from a strictly mechanical angle: evalu-
ation followed by decision. Most researchers in
strategy do not even discuss it. Companies reluc-
tantly communicate about their investment policy.
The term “investment” itself is rarely defined in the
literature, although several approaches or definitions
are possible.
Capital investment can be defined, in essence, as a
cash outflow made in the present in the hope of cash
inflows occurring in the future. Thus, one basic
characteristic of investment is that it contains uncer-
tainty. According to the dominant financial–economic
perspective, the purpose of an investment is to
increase a company’s economic capacity and financial
value. The strategic approach to investment proposes
a more complex view: investing, in the language of
strategy, is related to a company’s choices of
development.6 As expressed by De Bodt and Bouquin
(2001), following Bower (1970) and Klammer
(1994), “we become aware of an interest to invest
when we notice a gap between what should be and
what is. The investment is an answer. What is the
question? A recognizable ambition. Without strategy,
without a direction, the emergence of good projects is
unlikely to happen. The main part of the process lies
in the identification of true problems.”7
Investment decisions are financial decisions, but
they are often strategic decisions as well. Because
most strategic decisions translate into resource allo-
cations, they are investment decisions, or imply
4 There is little empirical work on this subject even in the field
of finance research. On this point, see the next section on
Capital investment decision-making literature, page 9.
6 I have freely translated from the original: “Investir, dans le
langage de la stratégie, renvoie à des choix de trajectoires de
développement de l’entreprise (construire, s’implanter, con-
server, se retirer d’un marché, absorber, s’allier, etc.)”
(Desreumaux and Romelaer 2001, p. 61).
5 I have freely translated from the original: “La décision
d’investissement n’occupe …qu’une place très faible dans les
analyses théoriques [micro et macroéconomique]” (Guerrien
2002).
7 I have freely translated from the original: “On prend
conscience de l'intérêt d'investir quand on constate un écart
entre ce qui devrait être et ce qui est […]. L'investissement est
une réponse. Quelle est la question? Une ambition identifiable.
Sans stratégie, sans projet connu, l'émergence de bons projets
est rendue peu probable. C'est dans l'identification des vrais
problèmes que réside l'essentiel du processus” (De Bodt and
Bourquin 2001, p. 127).
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investment decisions (Mintzberg et al. 1976).8 Strat-
egy and investments may influence each other; the
implementation of an investment can open new
possibilities which will influence strategy formula-
tion. Sometimes, a strategic direction develops pre-
cisely because an investment opportunity does exist.
Therefore, investment projects or decisions must be
analyzed not only from a financial angle but also from
a strategic angle.
In spite of the need for a multidisciplinary
approach to analyze, or even prescribe, investment
decision-making, the integration of the two main
languages of top management, finance, and strategy
remains undeveloped (Papadakis and Barwise 1998;
Shank 1996). Compartmentalization between scien-
tific domains is the rule in this field, and the link
between strategy and investment is rarely analyzed.
Researchers in the field of strategy show little interest
in investment, and researchers in the field of finance
show little interest in strategy.
Compartmentalization is also the rule in literature
on energy-efficiency investments. Most authors in the
field only take into consideration financial factors to
explain these investments; authors who do notice the
influence of the relationship between core business
and decision have not investigated the link between
the financial and strategic dimensions of investment
decision-making.
One exception to the compartmentalization of
finance and strategy can be found in the fields of
cost accounting and advanced manufacturing technol-
ogies (AMT) investments, where certain researchers,
observing the limits of financial evaluation tools to
evaluate qualitative strategic investments, advocate a
new approach to investments which would integrate
their financial and strategic dimensions (Adler 2000;
Lefley 1994; Putterill et al. 1996; Shank 1996;
Slagmulder et al. 1995). Some analytical tools have
been proposed in this regard, most of them derived
from strategic management: strategic cost management,
value chain analysis, benchmarking, balance scorecard,
SWOT (Strengths–Weaknesses–Opportunities–Threats),
and the five forces of competition (Porter 1980).
However, with the exception of benchmarking, these
tools seem to remain little used by companies to
complete their analysis of investment projects (Alkaraan
and Northcott 2006; Carr and Tomkins 1996).
Thus, financial evaluation methods of investment
projects, known as capital budgeting tools, dominate
strategic evaluation methods. Three capital budgeting
tools are most often used to assess investment
profitability9: payback period, net present value
(NPV), and internal rate of return (IRR) methods.
Payback period is the simplest method. It consists of
calculating the time necessary to entirely recover the
initial invested capital or, in other words, to realize at
least an operation with zero sum. Expressed in years
or in months, it is calculated by dividing the initial
cost of the investment by its annual income. The
selection of investment projects with the payback
period method is not based on profitability (which is
not assessed for the total life of the project) but on
risk, which is expressed by duration (in years).
Duration is generally shorter than 3 years. Net present
value is the discounted value of the investment cash
flows, assessed on the life cycle of a project, less any
initial investment costs. The discount rate (or reverse
compound interest rate) represents the minimum
requirement, by the investor, of return on the
investment, which is based on the cost of capital for
the firm and on the risk attached to the project: the
higher the risk, the higher the discount rate, the lower
the NPV, the less financially attractive the investment.
IRR is the discount rate at which the net present value
of an investment is equal to zero.10
In the case of energy-efficiency investments,
investment cash flows consist first in avoided costs:
energy costs and, in certain projects, maintenance
costs. A profitable energy-efficiency investment will
thus be an investment for which the initial costs are
compensated with savings resulting from reduced
energy consumption (of the building, the vehicle, the
industrial production line, etc.). Two main problems
make the evaluation of energy-efficiency investments
profitability difficult. The first problem lies in the
evaluation of the physical savings of an energy-
efficiency project, which is not easy to assess
9 Investment profitability measures the relationship between the
capital invested and the income which ensues from the
investment.
8 For instance, out of the 25 strategic decisions studied by
Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret (1976), 22 were invest-
ment decisions.
10 For a good description of capital budgeting methods, I advise
the following reading: “Finance for Managers” pp. 140–170.
Harvard Business Essential. Harvard Business School Press,
Boston, MA (2003).
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precisely. The second problem concerns the transla-
tion of the physical energy savings into monetary
terms, due to the difficulty of predicting future energy
prices. This difficulty grows with the duration of the
investment.
Capital investment decision-making literature
Few empirical works exist on how businesses make
their capital investment choices in real life. As
expressed by Jensen (1993: 870), “the finance
profession has concentrated on how capital invest-
ment decisions should be made, with little systematic
study on how they actually are made in practice.” In
business management research, this issue is related to
the academic fields of corporate finance or of
organizational decision-making (a subject under the
broad umbrella of OB, or organization behavior).
Empirical works conclude that financial evalua-
tion methods of investment are very widely used.
An Alkaraan and Northcott study (2006), carried
out in 2002–2003 with 83 large British companies
representing eight different industries, highlights
very high percentages in the use of financial
evaluation tools: respectively, 99%, 89%, and 96%
of the companies surveyed were using NPV, IRR,
and/or payback time methods. The Alkaraan and
Northcott study also shows that the use of these
techniques is in progress, that the simultaneous use
of several evaluation techniques is more and more
frequent,11 and that payback time is the first or
second method used. These results are similar to
those of Abdel-Kader and Dugdale (1998). On the
other hand, they differ from those of Graham and
Harvey (2001), whose survey, conducted on 392
American companies, has shown a less frequent use
of traditional financial evaluation methods (NPV,
IRR, payback time) and, among them, a superiority
of NPV (used by 75% of the companies surveyed)
and IRR (74%) on that of the payback time (57%).
However, according to Graham and Harvey, “small”
companies (those with a turnover smaller than $US
100 millions) use the payback method almost as
frequently as NPV/IRR.
However, a literature review shows that, in spite
of their widespread use, the use and role of
financial evaluation methods and of financial
factors on businesses investment choices is not as
straightforward and as important as is claimed by
mainstream financial–economic thought. This is
due to several different factors: quality of the
calculations, influence of national and corporate
cultures, importance of intuition and judgment as
opposed to analysis, importance of the investment
category, and importance of the investment strategic
character.
Several research studies bring to light the
influence of national culture and corporate culture
on general investment behavior and on the use and
role of financial evaluation techniques. For exam-
ple, with regard to investment decisions, Anglo-
Saxon companies seem more “financially oriented”
than German or Japanese companies, which are
more “strategically oriented.” In the first case, the
aim of investment is reaching a minimal rate of
return; in the second, it is a strategic goal such as a
market share increase. Carr and Tomkins (1996)
show that German companies make less use of
financial evaluation methods than their British
counterparts in the same industry and with different
requirements: Average payback time is 5 years for
German companies and 3.3 years for British
companies, although companies’ ownership also
plays a role (unquoted British companies have
payback times longer than quoted companies).
Pezet (2002: 256) describes how a strong “technical–
economic” corporate culture influences Pechiney’s
investment decisions, by acting as an interpretative
filter of environmental events and competition
moves.
The quality of the financial calculations made by
companies is questionable, and investment practices
are often contrary to finance theory prescriptions.
This was pointed out by several authors (Alkaraan
and Northcott 2006; DeCanio 1993; Graham and
Harvey 2001; Rigby 2002) and is obvious in the two
following examples. About 60% of the companies
surveyed by Graham and Harvey (2001) apply the
same discount rate (“company-wide discount rate”) to
all investment projects regardless of their particular
risk level. Payback method is very popular, in spite of
its defects, often underlined by finance theory (the
investment flows beyond the payback limit and the
11 For every investment project, 98% of surveyed companies
use more than one and 88%, more than two methods of
evaluation.
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time value of money are not taken into account).
Alkaraan and Northcott (2006), as well as Graham
and Harvey (2001), wonder at this popularity
explained, according to Graham and Harvey, by a
lack of sophistication of companies and decision-
makers, and not by budgetary constraints.
Intuition and judgment play an important role in
investment decision-making (Alkaraan and Northcott
2006; Carr and Tomkins 1996; Mintzberg et al. 1976;
Van Cauwenbergh et al. 1996) even though finance
theory prescribes to apply the analytic mode.12 This is
especially the case when the decision to be made is
strategic, as described in the following quote:“One
Group Finance Director offers an insight into why it is
that the ‘science’ of evaluative technique is unlikely
to ever supersede the ‘art’ of strategic decision-
making: ‘Intuition and judgment are absolutely
crucial. You can’t just take academic calculations
and sit down and look at them and say they make
sense…These decisions aren’t just based on hard
calculations—you have got to have a view of your
company when you’re talking to the people in it. So,
intuition and experience are extremely important’”
(Alkaraan and Northcott 2006: 168).
Mintzberg et al. (1976) have found that judgment is
by far the most frequent decision mode in investment
choices, but they note that, even when the analysis is
used, “evaluation gets distorted both by cognitive
limitations, that is, by information overload and by
unintended as well as intended biases” (Mintzberg et al.
1976: 259).
Several empirical studies (Bower 1970; Butler et
al. 1993; Carr et al. 1994) show that evaluation
methods intervene rather late in the investment
decision-making process and rather as a control ex
ante during the ratification phase. Mintzberg et al.
(1976) and Pezet (2002) make the same observation.
Research also indicates that the use of these techni-
ques is often partially diverted from their first
vocation by serving goals other than decision-
making support: For instance, Segelod (1997) puts
in evidence the symbolic role of these procedures:
rites actually serving to justify decisions already
taken. In their survey of strategic investment process-
es in 50 banks and huge Belgian companies, Van
Cauwenbergh et al. (1996) show that evaluation
procedures serve not only as decision tools but also as
communication tools and that companies with the most
financial leeway have less use of formal evaluation
procedures. Jensen (1993) indicates that the financial
theory rule, which specifies adopting any investment
with a positive NPV, is far from being universally
followed by decision-makers. Carr et al. (1994), Carr
and Tomkins (1996), and Van Cauwenbergh et al.
(1996) highlight the minimal real impact of formal
analyses—whether financial or risk analyses—on
strategic investment decision-making.
The use and role of evaluation techniques on
investment decision-making seems to be strongly
influenced by the investment category (such as
investment in production capacity, in production
process improvement, replacement of equipment,
diversification, etc.). Almost all companies use
investment categories to classify a project at the
beginning of the decision-making process, during the
highly important diagnosis phase (De Bodt and
Bouquin 2001). Afterward, investment category
influences the financial criteria used (duration, capital
budgeting tool, and discount rate) and the procedure
(type of analysis carried out; research of information
and development of the project; Chen 1995; De Bodt
and Bouquin 2001). However, more research is
needed on the influence of investment category on
investment decision-making, as few empirical works
are available.
Investment decision-making is also influenced by
investment nature, a concept referring to its strategic
character. Investment nature plays an important role
by influencing the hierarchic level at which a project
is initiated and the hierarchic level of the managers
championing a project (Maritan 2001), the decision
mode (analytic or intuitive), and the whole decision-
making process (Dean and Sharfman 1993). It also
influences the type of financial evaluation tools used
(Carr and Tomkins 1996),13 and profitability require-
12 “…the analytic mode, clearly distinguishing fact and value in
the selection phase. It postulates that alternatives are carefully
and objectively evaluated, their factual consequences explicitly
determined along various goal, or value, dimensions and then
combined according to some predetermined utility function—a
choice finally made to maximize utility” (Mintzberg et al. 1976,
p. 258).
13 On the contrary, Alkaraan and Northcott (2006) find that
financial evaluation techniques are applied indistinctly to all
investments, whether strategic or non-strategic. Yet, they note
that companies seem to look for a balance between strategic
criteria, mostly qualitative, and financial criteria, in their
evaluation of investment projects.
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ments (Parker et al. 2000; Quirion 2004), although
these aspects have been almost completely unex-
plored and deserve more work.
Empirical works have demonstrated the importance
of strategic factors in decision-making and the link
between investment decisions and a company’s
strategic goals (Alkaraan and Northcott 2006; Burcher
and Lee 2000; Butler et al. 1991; Carr and Tomkins
1996; De Bodt and Bouquin 2001; Maritan 2001;
Putterill et al. 1996; Segelod 1995; Van Cauwenbergh
et al. 1996). Ninety-three percent of Alkaraan and
Northcott (2006) survey respondents consider invest-
ments concordance with their company strategy as
“important” or “very important.” The research of Carr
and Tomkins (1996) shows that investments are
analyzed by companies according to strategic consid-
erations rather than according to their rate of return. In
Maritan’s (2001) research on strategic investments
made by a large American pulp and paper company,
she reports that, in this company, investment pro-
posals must specify the expected consequences of the
investment on production capacity and on products
and markets, as well as describe the link between the
investment considered and the strategy of the division
concerned. This procedure is similar to those of 29
important Swedish groups studied by Segelod (1997)
who, by comparing investment manuals, notes that
the investment link with strategy is one of the four
decision-making criteria for all managers at group
level (together with investment profitability, impact
on financing, and on coordination). Having compared
strategic investments decision-making processes in
three large English companies, Butler et al. (1991:
402) note that “product quality, fit with business
strategy and improving the competitive position of the
firm were the most important factors considered by all
informants in all three companies.” Several studies
also emphasize the quest for competitive advantage as
the first goal of capital investments, which is another
way to describe companies’ requirement for the
strategic fit14 of these investments. As part of an
international research project on investment decisions
in the manufacturing industry, a Burcher and Lee
survey (2000), in line with Putterill et al. (1996),
shows that obtaining/increasing competitive advan-
tage is the first—strategic—motivation of an invest-
ment AMT, before the expected financial profits.
Chen (1995) finds that firms rely as much on non-
financial techniques, as on discounted cash-flow
techniques in evaluating investment projects. Non-
financial techniques refer to “project evaluation
practice where companies analyze key nonfinancial
dimensions of investment projects such as strategy
linkage considerations, quality implications, future
flexibility and growth potential, and current and
future competition” (Chen 1995: 148).
In their review of research on formal decision
routines, De Bodt and Bouquin (2001) note that
competitiveness is the most important decision factor
in a situation of uncertainty (which characterize
strategic decisions) and that investment return plays
a non-determining role in investment decision-
making. A strong majority of the 44 companies
surveyed in their research subscribe to the follow-
ing assertions: “One can always find money to
finance a good project” (33 companies out of 44);
“profitability of an investment is not sufficient to
entail a positive decision” (37 companies out of
44); “above all, a project must contribute to the
realization of the company’s strategic goals” (40
companies out of 44). Thus, according to the De
Bodt and Bouquin (2001) results, the strategic
character of an investment is important enough to
block a profitable investment or, conversely, to boost
a non-profitable one.
Altogether, this literature review of capital
investment decision-making highlights a complex
process, influenced by many different factors. In
this process, evaluation tools and financial factors
often play a secondary role, in spite of their
extensive use. The strategic character of an invest-
ment is a most important decision-making factor,
more important than investment return. Strategic
investments are thus in a better position to win the
competition which exists between projects within
organizations (theorized by Langley, Mintzberg,
Pitcher, Posada, and Saint-Macary 1995). Findings
from the literature on (general) capital investment
decision-making thus mirror findings from the
alternative literature on energy-efficiency invest-
ments (see p. 4–6). Still, this conclusion leads to
the question: How can we define the strategic
character of an investment? In other words, what is
it that makes an investment strategic?
14 See sections on “Defining strategic” and on “Competitive
advantage” below.
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Investment decision-making literature, with very
few exceptions, does not discuss the issue. The
next section will review the strategic literature for




In the field of strategy, investment remains an “under-
analyzed and peripheral object” (Koenig 2001). In the
field of decision-making, a stream of research labeled
“strategy process research” studies strategic invest-
ment decision-making.
What is it that makes an investment strategic?
Answering this question is not easy or straightfor-
ward. Strangely, research on strategic decision-
making does not provide a satisfactory response
because its definitions are rather vague. Strategic
investment decisions are described by researchers of
this field as decisions of a vital importance (Butler et
al. 1991; Lu and Heard 1995; Schoemaker 1993), as
decisions which have a significant effect on the
organization as a whole (Carr and Tomkins 1996)
and have a significant potential for improving
corporate performance (Butler et al. 1991; Carr and
Tomkins 1996; Van Cauwenbergh et al. 199615).
Cossette highlights the ambiguity of the term, noting
that, in the end, “strategic” simply means “important”
or “not secondary” (Cossette 2004: 89). When they
are not emphasizing the importance of a decision for
an organization, definitions are even more vague, by
indicating that strategic decisions are decisions re-
garding the goals, domains, technologies, and struc-
ture of a firm (Child 1972, cited by Hitt and Tyler
1991: 331) or decisions regarding a firm’s develop-
ment through products–markets–technologies triplets
(Desreumaux and Romelaer 2001). Most of the
strategy process field researchers do not take into
account the content, or scope, of strategic investment
decisions. Therefore, on the whole, definitions pro-
vided by strategic process research are not compre-
hensive enough to analyze the strategic character of
investment decisions.
If strategic decision-making research does not
provide a satisfactory definition of what “strategic”
means, which definition can we use as a tool to
analyze how strategic an investment is? We can
answer this question in two different ways. First, we
can study a decision’s conformity to an organization’s
strategy. Second, we can evaluate the contribution of
a decision’s effects on an organization’s strategic
position. Let us examine in greater detail these two
approaches. To evaluate the strategic character of an
investment decision, we can first try to analyze how
its scope conforms to a firm’s strategy. For instance, if
this firm has adopted a cost leadership competitive
strategy, then any decision leading to costs reduction
would have a strategic character. However, a firm’s
strategy is not often identifiable, either because it is
not communicated outside the organization, or simply
because it does not exist. This is the stance of
Mintzberg, who defines strategy as “a pattern in a
stream of decisions” (Mintzberg 1978: 935). On the
whole, as Maritan and Schendel (1997: 261) put it,
“based on the existing literature, we know very little
about the relationship between an organization’s
strategy and the strategic decisions that are made by
the organization’s managers to either “determine” a
strategy, or “allow” a particular strategy to arise.
Therefore, it is difficult to qualify an investment
decision as strategic by analyzing its relationship or
its conformity with a firm’s existing strategy.
The alternative way of evaluating the strategic
character of an investment decision consists of
examining its scope and analyzing how it enables an
organization to strengthen its strategic position. To
conduct this analysis, it is necessary to draw from the
concepts of another vast research field in strategy, the
field of “strategy content.” “Strategy content” re-
search attempts, in a spirit generally more normative
than descriptive, to define the concept of strategy and
to give it content in terms of strategic actions and/or
decisions. This current lacks unity, however. In Hafsi
and Thomas’s 2005 paper, “The Field of Strategy: In
Search of a Walking Stick,” they critically acknowl-
edge the variety and vagueness of definitions:
“Apparently, we are not even sure if we agree on
the same definition of strategy…Such a lack of clarity
in the basic concept makes the search for meaningful
15 “Investments were considered strategic if they had a
significant potential for improving corporate performance. As
such, a strategic investment is important in terms of actions
taken and/or resources allocated” (Van Cauwenbergh et al.
1996, p. 169)
482 Energy Efficiency (2011) 4:473–492
research findings and hence theory construction
difficult” (Hafsi and Thomas 2005: 507). As Hafsi
and Thomas’s (2005) analysis concludes, a study of
the literature that has inspired business strategy
suggests five different intellectual frameworks: strat-
egy as a leader’s statement, as a community’s
statement, as a guiding track, as a relationship to the
environment, and as the building of competitive
advantage. In this last sense, strategy consists of
creating a sustainable competitive advantage, and it is
the concept held in most definitions. Indeed, most
authors in the field agree on the following elements
which are deducted from Porter’s principles of
competitive strategy (1980, 1985): strategy sets out
the basic direction of the organization, by specifying
the organization’s long-term activities and goals,
according to its internal resources and to external
factors, in order to build a durable competitive
advantage (Johnson and Scholes 1999: 27).
If strategy ultimately consists in creating a durable
competitive advantage, then we can consider that the
main constituent of the “strategic character of an
investment” is this investment’s impact on a firm’s
competitiveness. Therefore, based on these various
considerations, I suggest the following definition: An
investment is strategic if it contributes to create,
maintain, or develop a sustainable competitive ad-
vantage. This definition implies that an investment, or
an investment decision, is not simply strategic or non-
strategic, contrary to the approach maintained by
strategy process research. But, it is in line with the
distinction made by the researchers of the strategy
content current between global strategy and opera-
tional strategies16 and with Maritan research (2001)
which shows how investments may have different
strategic importance. Any decision is more or less
strategic. Strategic decision-making is a continuum,
where decisions can be non-strategic, weakly strate-
gic, strongly strategic, or totally strategic. The more
strategic a decision is, the more it contributes to
competitive advantage, the more it is important for a
firm’s performance or even survival, and the more
complex and uncertain it will be.
Competitive advantage
Having defined a strategic investment as an invest-
ment contributing to a firm’s competitive advantage,
we have to define the term competitive advantage.
According to Michael Porter, “competitive advantage
grows fundamentally out of value a firm is able to
create for its buyers that exceeds the firm’s cost of
creating it.” (Porter 1985: 3). Value is what buyers are
willing to pay for what a firm provides them. Value is
measured by total revenue. “Superior value stems
from offering lower prices than competitors for
equivalent benefits or providing unique benefits that
more than offset a higher price” (Porter idem.). In
other words, “it must deliver greater value to
customers or create comparable value at a lower cost,
or do both” (Porter 1996: 2).
Two theoretical approaches have defined the
means to build superior value at a lower cost: the
“activities approach” and the “strategic resources
approach.” The first approach is centered on the
concept of activities which are “the basic units of
competitive advantage: how to select the “right
activities out of the hundreds required to create,
produce, sell, and deliver products or services” and
how to perform these activities more efficiently than
competitors (Porter 1996: 62). According to Michael
Porter (idem. 64), “the essence of strategy is in the
activities—choosing to perform activities differently
or to perform different activities than rivals.” A
tailored set of activities forms a value system, the
source of a sustainable competitive advantage. Value
activities can be divided into two broad types,
primary activities, involved in the physical creation
of the product and its sale and transfer to the buyer as
well as after-sale assistance, and support activities.
Support activities support the primary activities by
providing purchased inputs, technology, human
resources, and various firm-wide functions (Porter
16 Researchers distinguish two levels of elaboration of strategy
(Hafsi and Thomas 2005; Johnson and Scholes 1999; Porter
1985): global strategy—huge orientations defined at corporate
or business level, and the functional or operational strategies
which determine the resource allocations necessary to imple-
ment strategic orientations defined at the global level. Global
level is responsible for positioning with regard to competitors;
functional level is in charge of productivity and organizational
efficiency. In other words, global strategy level is in charge of
effectiveness, while functional strategy level is in charge of
efficiency. “Efficiency is about doing things the right way. It
involves eliminating waste and optimizing processes. Effec-
tiveness is about doing the right things. There is no point in
acting efficiently if what you are doing will not have the desired
effect. A good strategy will blend both efficiency and
effectiveness”. (Wikipedia, article “Strategic Management”,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_management).
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1985). The value chain concept (Porter 1985),
represented by the figure on the next page, is the
most appropriate tool to analyze both types of
activities and the links between them, leading to
value creation (Fig. 1).
The second theoretical approach to competitive
advantage is based on the concept of strategic
resources. According to the resource-based view
(RBV) [on strategy], resources are the founding
elements of competitive advantage. Many definitions
have been proposed for this complex concept. One
that is recent and complete is provided by Bingham
and Eisenhardt (2008: 243) who, building on the
work of Wernerfelt (1984) and Barney (1991), define
resources as “the tangible assets (e.g., location, plant,
equipment), intangible assets (e.g., patents, brands,
technical knowledge), and organizational processes
(e.g., product development, country entry, partnering)
from which managers can develop value-creating
strategies.” Most authors in the RBV field distinguish
between tangible resources, which include physical,
human, and financial resources, and intangible resour-
ces, which have no material existence, as patents,
image, or reputation. Fundamentally, a strategic re-
source is a resource which contributes to building a
unique proposition to customers17 (Ramanantsoa
1997). Most of the RBV researchers consider that only
VRIN resources are a source of competitive advantage.
A VRIN resource enables the raising of revenues or
lowering of costs (Valuable); in the context of a
given market, it is unique among firms in that
market (Rare); it cannot be readily copied (Inimi-
table); other resources do not provide the same
functionality (Non-substitutable; Bingham and
Eisenhardt 2008: 243). Bingham and Eisenhardt
dispute this approach by asserting that competitive
advantage is not dependent on specific character-
istics of resources but on the links between them.18
This explains why common or ordinary resources, if
they are closely tied, mutually strengthen each other
and are a source of competitive advantage.
Let us note that neither the “activities approach”
nor the “RBV approach” on competitive advantage
ever mention energy, energy management, or energy
services as sources of competitive advantage for
organizations. In fact, these elements are very rarely
mentioned. In the value chain, physical components
(buildings and equipment) must be categorized in the
infrastructure; energy purchase is part of the procure-
ment activity, and energy management must be
categorized in technology development.19 Energy
itself is a purchased input. However, neither Porter
(1985) nor Johnson and Scholes (1999) mention
energy in their description of the value chain.
Similarly in the RBV, physical resources are implic-
17 Freely translated by me; originally “à entretenir le caractère
unique du produit aux yeux du client” (Ramanantsoa 1997, p.
3041).
18 “Overall the argument that specific VRIN resources per se
are themselves the source of competitive advantage misidenti-
fies the true source of advantage. That is, the specific
characteristics of resources per se are neither necessary nor
sufficient conditions for competitive advantage” (Bingham &
Eisenhardt 2008, p. 254).
19 “Which consists of a range of activities that can be broadly
grouped into efforts to improve the product and the process”
(Porter 1985, p. 42).
Fig. 1 The generic value
chain (Porter 1985) and
energy
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itly considered as elements of secondary importance
because they are resources with specific and limited
use (Bingham and Eisenhardt 2008). Hammer (2004)
as well as Teece, Pisano, and Shuen (1997) also note
that the physical part of the organization is the one
which, for some years, is the least valued by
management, as opposed to non-material, intangible
resources.
Value, cost, and risk: the three dimensions
of competitive advantage
The two approaches on competitive advantage briefly
described above—activities approach and strategic
resources approach—agree on several important
points. In the first place, chosen activities or devel-
oped resources must emphasize the unique character
of a firm’s offer with regard to that of its competitors.
This unique character is about its fundamental know-
how, and about its core business. Second, competitive
advantage results as much from links between
activities as from the activities themselves, or from
linkages between resources as from resources them-
selves. Therefore, even common or ordinary resources
can be a source of competitive advantage. Thirdly,
competitive advantage is a bi-dimensional concept.
These two dimensions are, on one hand, value (which
a firm is able to create for its buyers) and, on the other
hand, cost (of creating this value). The two
approaches to competitive advantage only differ in
the means to develop superior value and reduce costs:
choice of activities for one and resources development
for the other.
However, this definition of a competitive advan-
tage based on two dimensions—value and cost—
seems incomplete because the risk dimension is
missing. Any decision contains risk, because
decision-making consists in making a choice under
uncertainty. In spite of this, risk is treated sparsely
in the business strategy literature. Risk is also
generally little discussed in energy-efficiency in-
vestment literature, apart from the financial risk
stemming from these investments’ irreversibility,
which is often mentioned as the reason for their
low real return. In the Sorrell et al. (2000) survey,
respondents mention that risk—core business risk or
technical risk linked to new technologies adoption—
is the third barrier to positive decision-making on
energy-efficiency investments.
Beyond these analyses, investments in energy-
saving technologies can potentially present several
strategic risks of implementation, along Thiétard
and Xuereb (2009) typology: technical risks related
to technologies reliability, resources risks (change
of suppliers or information systems), human errors
risks (lack of skills in the use or maintenance of
new equipments), risks of production or informa-
tion processes dysfunctions in case of replacement
of existing equipment. Another risk, characteristic
of energy-efficiency investments, is related to the
uncertainty of their outcome, as energy savings
and financial savings resulting from these invest-
ments are uncertain (see last paragraph on p. 8).
However, these investments can also entail a
reduction of certain risks (or at least a reduction
of the exposure to these risks): energy and carbon
price risk, energy supply risk, and legal or
operations risks. In the field of energy, energy
supply disruption risk is real for multiple reasons:
geopolitical tensions, extreme climatic events, and
intrinsic fragilities of networks and of networks
interconnections.
The energy resource feeds the whole value chain of
firms, which means that the totality of their activities
(with the exception of computing services which are
heavily backed-up) is stopped in case of energy
disruption.
In their resource dependence theory, Pfeffer and
Salancik (1978) define the dependence of an organi-
zation A towards a resource, or towards another
organization B supplying this resource, as resting on
two dimensions. In the first place, the importance of
the resource, or, more precisely, its critical character,
in measuring an organization’s capacity to perform its
activities without this given resource; in the second
place, concentration of the resource control. This
second dimension includes two interrelated aspects:
on one hand, the degree to which organization B
controls resource usage and distribution and, on the
other hand, the existence—and accessibility—of
alternative supply sources. These two dimensions
come together in the concept of non-substitutability
of the resource and of its supplier. The higher the
substitutability, the smaller the dependence, which
will thus be maximal in the case of an important—or
critical—resource, and of a high concentration of this
resource control. Non-substitutability of a given
resource, as well as the risks or opportunities related
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to non-substitutability, is a concept common to
resource dependence theory and to RBV.20
The various theoretical frameworks briefly dis-
cussed here—strategic risk, resource dependence, and
RBV—lead me to suggest to taking risk as a third
dimension of competitive advantage, supplementing
the value and costs dimensions. According to this
analysis, I suggest enlarging the definition of com-
petitive advantage by saying that competitive advan-
tage is a three-dimensional concept, formed of three
interrelated constituents: costs, value, and risks. I
have designed the figure below to illustrate the three
dimensions of competitive advantage (Fig. 2):
A common “walking stick” for practitioners
and researchers
This conceptual scheme of competitive advantage
can be used to investigate firms’ investment
decisions, as well as “a way of thinking to be
practiced.” In this way, it is a common “walking
stick” for practitioners, to guide decisions and their
implementation, and for researchers, to find general
patterns behind these decisions and their implemen-
tation (Hafsi and Thomas 2005).21
Using the tri-dimensional concept of competitive
advantage to analyze firms’ investment decisions
highlights how different their needs and behaviors
are, because sources of competitive advantage are
varied and depend on the structure of the industry, as
well as on firms’ individual activities and resources.
For instance, in some industry sectors, cost leadership
is a “must” strategy. This is the case, for instance, for
European producers of steel alloys confronted with
low-cost competition from South-East Asia. Strategic
approach enables the understanding that energy cost
is an important decision-driver in energy-intensive
industries only if cost leadership is a compulsory
competitive strategy. If not, firms, even energy-
intensive ones, may neglect energy cost reduction
opportunities because corresponding investments are
not strategic enough or because they are less strategic
than other investments. Therefore energy-efficiency
investments projects, even if highly profitable, will
lose out in the competition for financial resources and
for the time and energy of powerful managers.
In this regard, it must be emphasized that, contrary
to what is generally described in the energy-efficiency
literature, it is not because energy-efficiency invest-
ments do not get support from the upper management
that they are not decided, it is the other way around; it
is because these investments are not strategic that they
are not championed by upper management, which is
one of the reasons why they end up in a negative or
no-decision.
In many industry sectors, value is the most
important source of competitive advantage. In this
respect, an important point emphasized by Michael
Porter (1985: 38)—to be remembered when framing
energy-efficiency projects—is that
“Value, instead of cost, must be used in
analyzing competitive position since firms often
deliberately raise their cost in order to command
a premium price via differentiation”
In the field of energy efficiency, value can be
created in many different ways, such as, for instance,
a positive image (image and reputation are strategic
resources), or a comfortable store (efficiently heated/
cooled or ventilated). Yet, in other sectors, risk
reduction can be a major source of competitive
advantage. For instance, in some industries (such as
electronic components manufacturing), stable produc-
tion temperatures are indispensable not only to
product quality but also to obtain the quality
certification or label indispensable to sales. For these
industries then, variations of temperature in a building
or in an industrial site due to a poor building envelope
21 “…both practitioners and researchers need a walking stick, a
common walking stick. For the practitioners of strategy the
objective is to guide decisions and their implementation, while
for the researcher in strategy the objective is to develop the
approach to find the general patterns behind these decisions
and their implementation, and to generate heuristics that
provide the link from patterns (theories) to practice in specific
situations, that is to inform and guide practice” (Hafsi and
Thomas 2005, p. 513).
Value 
Risks Costs
Fig. 2 The three dimensions
of competitive advantage
20 RBV considers non-substitutability as a core component of a
strategic character of a resource or a combination of resources,
summarized in the VRIN acronym: Valuable, Rare, Inimitable,
and Non-substitutable. See above in the same section.
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can be not only prejudicial to production quality but
may also lead to losing an important certification.
A three-dimensional competitive advantage is a
new business strategy concept, as well as a new
strategic evaluation method to assess investments. In
other words, a new approach to analyze (or champi-
on) investments, irrespective of investment category,
is proposed here. How energy-efficiency investments
can contribute to the three dimensions of businesses’
competitive advantage needs to be assessed for each
industry, each company, and each project. This work
must be developed in close cooperation between
engineers and business management specialists. An
example of applying this new approach to an energy-
efficiency investment project is briefly described in
the next section.
Implications of the findings: make it strategic!
The literature review in this paper has shown that
financial return is not the major driver of investment
decision-making; strategic character of an investment
is the most important decision-making factor. Strate-
gic or core business logic is always more powerful
than financial logic, which is actually encompassed
by strategic or core business logic. Therefore, energy-
efficiency investment projects must be interpreted less
by their financial approach (concerned with invest-
ment return) and more by their strategic approach
according to each project’s contribution to competi-
tive advantage. This conclusion meets the findings of
alternative research on organizations’ energy-
efficiency investments which highlights the fact that,
among the numerous factors negatively influencing
energy-efficiency investments, one of the most influ-
ential seems to be the no-link between the investment
under consideration and a company’s core business
(see p. 6, par. 2). Based on this conclusion, we can
hypothesize that the fact that energy-efficiency invest-
ments are considered to be weakly strategic by firms
explains—at least partially—why these investments
often remain undecided. No research corroborates
with this hypothesis because this approach is new,
especially in the field of energy efficiency.22 Strategic
character of energy-efficiency investments could be
assessed by using the conceptual scheme of compet-
itive advantage proposed here.
Pre-eminence of strategic logic over financial logic
in investment decision-making has implications for all
actors in the energy-efficiency field.
Implications for practitioners
By a large majority, energy-efficiency practitioners
(for instance, engineers doing energy audits) follow
the dominant financial approach, by emphasizing the
return on energy-efficiency investments and the
energy costs reductions associated with these invest-
ments. But this argument will be taken into account as
an important decision-driver only in industry sectors
where low costs are a strategic necessity. To success-
fully sell energy-efficiency projects, energy practi-
tioners must meet businesses’ needs, and consider
their concerns and mindsets. In order to achieve this,
they have to adopt a broader strategic approach, by
investigating how, for each individual firm, energy-
efficiency investment projects can contribute to
building or reinforcing a firm’s competitive advantage
in performing its core business, in all three dimen-
sions: value, costs, and risks. This can be done by
using indifferently the activities approach or the
resource approach briefly described above, or a
combination of both. Energy services companies
should also switch from a financial perspective to a
strategic perspective.
This bridging between the fields of energy-
efficiency and strategic management should incorpo-
rate analysis of non-energy benefits of energy-
efficiency investments (Jakob 2006; Kats et al.
2003; Mills et al. 2008; Mills and Rosenfeld 1994;
Pye and McKane 1999; Worrell et al. 2003).
As mentioned, the competitive advantage con-
ceptual framework described in this paper is a new
strategic evaluation method to assess investments.
An example of how this framework can be applied
to energy-efficiency investments can be given by
integrating the Worrell et al. (2003) framework of
the non-energy benefits resulting from efficiency
improvements, represented in the table on the next
page (Table 1).
The various non-energy benefits described in the
Worrell et al. framework could be tentatively trans-
lated and integrated into the competitive advantage
22 My own PhD research, in fact, aimed at testing this
hypothesis. Its results will be described in a subsequent paper.
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conceptual framework as represented in the figure on
the next page (Fig. 3).
In a tertiary sector firm (such as a general store),
some non-energy benefits could be categorized not
only in the costs dimension of competitive advantage
but also in the value dimension. This would be the
case for non-energy-benefits improving office—or
sales—space comfort (through reduced noise, im-
proved air quality, and temperature control) and
improving products display (thanks to improved
lighting).
Some of the factors contributing to increasing
competitive advantage are only qualitative and cannot
be captured quantitatively. Others can be quantified
(by using, among others, the data and methodology of
non-energy benefits research) and incorporated into
financial calculations of energy-efficiency invest-
ments return.
Implications for scholars
Several aspects of these findings need further
research: the influence of the strategic character of
an investment on the decision-making process and
its result (a positive, negative, or no-decision), and
this same influence on the capital budgeting tools
used, as well as on financial requirements for
profitability (number of years in case of payback
method, discount rate in case of dynamic methods
such as NPV, IRR). Regrettably, too little attention
in research has been dedicated to a comparative
analysis of the evaluation methods for strategic and
non-strategic investments, which could bring to
light differences in treatment. In this regard, it
would be interesting to investigate whether the
payback method is more widely applied by com-
panies to non-strategic investments, whereas the
dynamic methods (which imply a longer time
period) are applied to strategic investments. With
regard to energy-efficiency investments, the pay-
back method is by far the most widely used
financial evaluation method.
Implications for public program developers
Until now, most public programs aiming at pro-
moting energy-efficiency investments were based
on a classical financial approach and on energy
costs reduction. Accordingly, they were supplying
information (on investment return) and/or financial
subsidies (to increase investments return and thus
make them more attractive to investors), with a
somewhat mixed effectiveness (Gillingham, New-
ell, and Palmer 2009). Switching from a classical
financial perspective to a strategic perspective on
energy-efficiency investments leads to the develop-
ment of public programs which try to highlight the
strategic character of these investments. In this
regard, an issue which must be addressed—one
which is not within the scope of this article,
however—is the fact that investments are not—or
not only—strategic for objective reasons but also for
subjective reasons. The way they are perceived as
more or less strategic by organizations and manag-
Table 1 Non-energy benefits from efficiency improvements (Worrell et al. 2003)
Waste Emissions Operation and maintenance
Use of waste fuels, heat, gas Reduced dust emissions Reduced need for engineering controls
Reduced product waste Reduced CO, C02, NOx, SOx emissions Lowered cooling requirements
Reduced waste water Increased facility reliability
Reduced hazardous waste Reduced wear and tear on equipment/machinery
Materials reduction Reductions in labor requirements
Production Working environment Other
Increased product output/yields Reduced need for personal protective equipment Decreased liability
Improved equipment
performance
Improved lighting Improved public image
Shorter process cycle times Reduced noise levels Delaying or reducing capital expenditures
Improved product quality/purity Improved temperature control Additional space
Increased reliability in production Improved air quality Improved worker morale
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ers is influenced by cognitive and interpretative
filters which especially influence the first step of the
decision-making process: the diagnostic phase. As
stated by Lyles (1987: 266), based on Weick (1979),
“organizations will invent the environment to which
they will respond by deciding which aspects of the
environment are important or unimportant”. Orga-
nizational and individual filters need to be taken
into account when trying to identify and communi-
cate the strategic character of energy-efficiency
investments.
Conclusion
Alternative energy literature and capital investment
decision-making literature converge on the same
conclusions: Financial factors play only a partial or
even secondary role in investment decisions, and the
strategic character of an investment seems to have the
main influence on decision-making. This explains
why companies sometimes make negative decisions
on profitable investments and conversely, make





• Improved product quality/purity
• Increased reliability in
production
• Improved temperature control
• Increased facility reliability
• Improved public image
REDUCED RISKS:
• Reduced hazardous waste
• Reduced dust emissions
• Reduced CO, CO2, NOx, SOx
emissions
• Increased facility reliability
• Reduced wear and tear on
equipment /machinery
• Decreased liability
RISKS REDUCED WHICH ARE NOT
INCLUDED IN WORRELL, et al. (2003)
FRAMEWORK:
• Legal risks
• Carbon & energy price risks
• Disruption of energy supply
• Commercial risk
REDUCED COSTS:
• Use of waste fuels
• Reduced product waste
• Reduced waste water
• Materials reduction
• Increased product yield
• Improved equipment performance
• Shorter process cycle time
• Reduced dust emissions
• Reduced CO, CO2, NOx, SOx
emissions
• Reduced wear and tear on
equipment machinery
• Decreased liability
• Reduced need for personal
protective equipment
• Improved lighting
• Reduced turnover, absenteeism
and health costs (improved worker
morale, reduced noise, improved air
quality and temperature control)
• Reduced needs for engineering
controls
• Lowered cooling requirements
• Reductions for labor requirements
• Delaying or Reducing capital
expenditures
• Additional space




Worrell et al. (2003)
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Financial factors and capital budgeting analysis do
not determine investment decision-making, and com-
panies often do not obey capital investment theory
injunctions. Therefore, capital investment theory has
only a normative—as opposed to explanatory—validity.
Moreover, the numerous organizational factors influ-
encing investment decision-making (described by the
alternative energy literature and also addressed by the
decision-making literature, although not discussed in
this paper) challenge the explanatory validity of the
other theoretical frameworks which dominate energy
economics: the neo-classical economics framework, as
well as transaction cost economics, principal agency
theory, economics of information, and behavioral
economics. The core concepts of agency theory and
transaction cost economics (lack of information,
bounded rationality, and individual opportunism) are
far from sufficient to explain corporate investment
decision-making.
The partial influence of financial factors and the
importance of strategic factors in investment decisions
entail several practical conclusions for practitioners as
well as for public policy programs aiming to promote
corporate energy-efficiency investments. First, im-
proving investment return (through subsidies or low
interest loans) will not be sufficient to ensure a
positive decision; second, information on investment
return will not be of much help either; third, it is
necessary to ascertain—and communicate—the im-
pact of energy-efficiency investments on firms’
competitive advantage, or in other words, to highlight
the strategic character of these investments.
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